A HUNDRED AND TEN YEARS OF THE
CONSTITUTION.-PART VIII.
Upon re-assembling, next day, the Convention at once
resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole to consider
both the Virginia and the New Jersey plans. In the long
and exhaustive debate which ensued, it can be said with
truth that it would be difficult to imagine a phase of the
question-the broad, general question-or a single point
in connection with it, that was not brought out. A vote was
not reached until June i 9 th; and several speeches longer
than any yet delivered, were made in the intervening three
days. It is worthy of remark, however, that but few members participated. Two new debaters appeared, one on each
side-and both from New York: Hamilton and Lansing.
Of course, the former favored the Virginia plan, the latter
the New Jersey plan--and only one other member-the
proposerof the plan, Mr. Patterson,raised his voice in support of it. On the other hand, Messrs. Madison, Wilson
and Randolph-to whom we may fairjy add Mr. Pinckney
and Mr. King-were determinedly dinst it. Mr. Lansing opened the debate in much the same way as did Mr.
Webster many years later-he "callea for the reading of
the resolutions" at the head of each plan-for the purpose
of contrasting them. He then stated truly enough that they
were radically different in principle: "That of Mr. Patterson sustains the sovereignty of the respective States, that
of Mr. Randolph destroys it.

.

.

.

The plan of Mr.

Randolph, in short, absorbs all power, except what may be
exercised in the little local matters of the States which are
not objects worthy of supreme cognizance." One would
suppose that this strong contrasting of the two plans would
be followed by an earnest advocacy of the one or the other
on the ground of its intrinsic merit-nothing of the kind!
He states his principal objections to the Virginia plan to be,
first, the want of power in the Convention to propose it;
and second, the improbability of its adoption! And Mr.
Patterson, who followed him, said practically the same
9o
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thing: "Our object is not such a government as may be
best in itself, but such a one as our constituents have authorized us to prepare, and as they will approve." It is
true that he urged that the Virginia plan would be "enormously expensive"-and also that he based his contention
to lack of power on the part of the Convention to propose
it upon the lack of power in the States themselves, except
by a unanimous vote, to do away with the Confederacy.
The argument as to the lack of power in the Confederacy
was well answered by Mr. Wilson in a few words-he "conceived himself authorized to conclude nothing, but to be
at liberty to propose anything." He contrasted the two
plans point by point-the great contrast really being that
representation of the people at large was the basis of the
Virginia plan-"the State legislatures the pillars of the
other."
He also called attention to the danger of "legislative
despotism" from a single body-a legislature should be bicameral.
Mr. Randolph followed in a strong speech, setting forth
the need for a National Government. The Confederate
plan had been tried and found wanting; a resort to coercion,
as suggested in the New Jersey plan, would be an impracticable and cruel expedient, and national legislation over
individuals must therefore be resorted to-and much more
to the same effect. Mr. Dickinson made a motion, which
was carried, to postpone consideration of the first resolution in the New Jersey plan to take up a resolution to the
effect that the alterations in the Articles of Confederation
should be such as would "render the Government of the
United States adequate to the exigencies, preservation and
the prosperity of the Union." The debate, however--or
rather the attacks upon the New Jersey plan-continued
on general lines, and Mr. Hamilton took the floor for the
first time, delivering what has been termed a "highly nationalistic speech"-and so it was; but while, perhaps, he
goes somewhat further than any of his fellow-members,
many of his arguments are most cogent. He strongly contended that any arrangement which made the 'State governments instead of the General Government the most impor-
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tant in the eyes of the people, would, to use the words of
President Buchanan, "contain the seeds of its own dissolution." I commend all the speeches in this debate to the careful attention of all students of the subject. Mr. Hamilton
concluded by reading a sketch of a plan, expressly disclaiming any intention to lay it before the Committee as such, but
submitting it as a general statement of his ideas. I propose
to give this sketch in full, for several reasons: First, because it shows how strongly the need of a General Government was felt by one of the ablest men of the day; second,
because it represents the high-water mark of nationalistic
utterance in the Convention, and lastly, because it is more
like-or rather, less unlike-the Constitution as finally
adopted, than is the New Jersey plan:
I. The Supreme Legislative power of the United States
to be vested in two different bodies of men: the one to be
called the Assembly, the other tiCeSenate; who together
shall form the Legislature of the Ufiited States, with power
to pass all laws whatsoever, subject to the negative hereafter mentioned.
II. The Assembly to consist of persons elected by the
people to serve for three years.
III. The Senate to consist of persons elected to serve
during good behavior; their election to be made by electors
chosen for that purpose by the people. In order to do this,
the States to be divided into Election Districts. On the
death, removal or resignation of a Senator, his place to be
filled out of the district from which he came.
IV. The Supreme Executive authority of the United
States to be vested in a Governor, to be elected to serve during good behavior; the election to be made by electors
chosen by the people in the Election Districts aforesaid. The
authorities and functions of the Executive to be as follows:
To have a negative on all laws about to be passed; to have
the direction of war when authorized or begun; to have,
with the advice and approbation of the Senate, the power of
making all treaties; to have the sole appointment of the
heads or chief officers of the Departments of Finance, War
and Foreign Affairs; to have the nomination of all other
officers (ambassadors to foreign nations included), subject
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to approbation or rejection of the Senate; to have the
power of pardoning all offences except treason, which he
shall not pardon without the approbation of the Senate.
V. On the death, resignation or removal of the Governor,
his authorities to be exercised by the President of the Senate till a successor be appointed.
VI. The Senate to have the sole power of declaring war;
the power of advising and approving all treaties; the power
of approving or rejecting all appointments of officers, except the heads or chiefs of the Departments of Finance,
War and Foreign Affairs.
VII. The supreme judicial authority to be vested in
judges, to hold their offices during good behavior, with
adequate and permanent salaries. This court to have
original jurisdiction in all causes of capture, and appellative
jurisdiction in all causes in which the revenues of the General Government, or the citizens of foreign nations, are
concerned.
VIII. The Legislature of the United States to have
power to institute courts in each State for the determination of all matters of general concern.
IX. The Governor, Senators, and all officers of the
United States, to be liable to impeachment for mal- and corrupt conduct; and upon corfviction, to be removed from office, and disqualified from holding any place of trust or
profit; all impeachments to be tried by a court to consist
of the Chief
, or Judge of the Superior Court of
Law of each State, provided such judge shall hold his
place during good behavior and have a permanent salary.
X. All laws of the particular States contrary to the Constitution-or laws of the United States to be utterly void;
and the better to prevent such laws being passed, the Governor or President of each State shall be appointed by the
General Government, and shall have a negative upon the
laws about to be passed in the State of which he is Governor or President.
XI. No State to have any forces, land or naval; and
the militia of all the States to be under the sole and exclusive direction of the United States, the officers of which
to be appointed and commissioned by them.
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It is amusing to picture to one's self the feelings which
the reading of this "sketch" must have aroused in Yates,
Lansing, Luther Martin, and others like them; horror,
amazement and disgust must have filled their minds; it was
an "abomination unto them." There is little resemblance
between either the sketch or the New Jersey plan and the
Constitution; but I have said that the sketch was less unlike it than the plan. Let us compare both with it, and see.
First. The sketch and the Constitution provide for a
single Executive-the plan for a plural Executive-at least
by strong implication.
Second. The sketch and the Constitution provide for a
bi-cameral Legislature-the plan for a single house.
Third. The sketch and the Constitution provide for the
election of the Executive by electors chosen by the peoplethe plan for an Executive chosen by "the United: States in
Congress."
Fourth. The sketch and the Constitution provide for the
election of one branch of the General Legislature by the
people-the plan does not provide for the direct participation of the people in the General Government at all.
Fifth. The sketch and the Constitution provide for the
creation of inferior courts by Congress-the plan does not.
Sixth. The sketch and the Constitution provide for a
successor-practically the same successor-to the Executive Officer upon his death, etc.-the plan does not.
Seventh. The sketch and the plan provide for the
nomination of various officers to the Senate by the Executive-the plan has no such provision.
Eighth-andmost important-Neither the sketch nor the
Constitution profess to be amendments to or revisions of
the Articles of Confederation; the plan is avowedly nothing else. I think I may say with entire confidence, that
excepting the provision for a Supreme Court to be appointed by the Executive, and its jurisdiction, there is not
a line in the plan in which a resemblance to the Constitution
can be found.
Mr. Hamilton's sketch provoked no comment. His
ideas were far in advance of what the Convention was
prepared to do-for they meant the practical annihilation of
the States even as local autonomies.
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Next day the resolution of Mr. Dickinson was voted
down, and the debate was closed by Mr. Madison in a
long and able speech, in which he showed the inadequacy
of a Confederacy to the needs of the country. He cited
numerous examples of confederacies in past times--"the
Amphictyonic and Achaean Confederacies among the ancients, and the Helvetic, Germanic and Belgic among the
moderns"-in support of his argument. In all of them
there had been a tendency by the members to encroach upon
joint body. At the conclusion of his speech, a motion to
postpone the first resolution of the New Jersey plan was
carried by a vote of all the States except New York and
New Jersey. And a motion by Mr. King, to the effect that
the Committee rise and report the Virginia plan as before,
was carried, New York, New Jersey and Delaware voting
"no," and Maryland being divided.
But the matter was far from settled. The whole question
was discussed again in Convention, and a few new ideas were
brought out, although much that had been said before was
said over again, as is usual in such cases. The immediate
question before the house was the first resolution of the
Committee's report, to the effect that a National Government ought to be established. Mr. Wilson took occasion to
say that he did not favor the abolition or practical annihilation of the State Governments-quite the contrary; and
the same thing was said by Mr. Mason a little later.
It is quite instructive to note the varied opinions with
regard to the actual status of the States. Mr. King, for
example, asserted that the States were not really "sovereign"
-that if they retained some portion of their sovereignty,
they had"certainly divested themselves of essential portions
of it; while Mr. Martin declared that the separation from
Great Britain placed the thirteen States in a "state of nature toward each other"-and that but for the Confederation they would be so still. This was utterly denied by Mr.
Wilson and Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Wilson saying that they
had been declared free and independent as "United Colonies."
I do not propose to discuss this question over again. In a
former article I have tried to show briefly that Mr. Martin
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was right. I merely notice these utterances, as evidence
that the ideas of "divided sovereignty" and of our being
"one people" from the beginning had very respectable supporters at the time.. Mr. Ellsworth now moved to strike
out the word "National" in the resolution, so that it would
run, "The Government of the United States ought to consist," etc. The advocates of a General Government cared
little what it was called; and as this change would probably
soothe the feelings of many whose feelings would have to
be soothed, no objection was made to it; and of course the
corresponding change was made in all subsequent resolutions. Considerable importance is attached to this by later
writers, as tending to prove that the idea of a truly "national" Government was explicitly abandoned. Nothing
could be more misleading. The term "National" was supposed by some to savor of undue centralism, of the total
demolition of Statehood, which was never seriously thought
of by any appreciable number of delegates. The real opponents of the Virginia plan were just as determinedly so
as ever, for when the second resolution providing for a
bi-cameral Legislature came before'th6 House, Mr. Lansing
once more stated that the real question was whether the
Convention proposed to adhere to the "foundation of the
present Confederacy," again urging the lack of power on
the part of the Convention to do anything else than adhere to that foundation, and the impossibility of inducing
the people to approve of anything different. He attacked
with some force the provision giving the General Legislature a negative upon State enactments. He moved, as a
substitute for the second resolution, "That the powers of
legislation be vested in the United States in Congress."
This motion was lost by the usual vote. Dr. Johnson, of
Connecticut, said that if the advocates of the Virginia plan
could show that the individuality of the States would not be
endangered by the plan, many of their objections would be
removed. He was ably answered by Mr. Wilson and Mr.
Madison. The remarks of the latter were so very clear and
comprehensive that I will try to give the substance of them.
He contended that there was less of danger of encroachments by than upon the General Government, and that en-
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croachments by it were lesser evils than encroachments upon
it; that the history of confederacies the world over had
shown that the tendency was rather toward anarchy than toward despotism-of which the existing Confederacy was a
shining example. In answer to the objection that under the
proposed General Government the tendency would be the
other way, he said that even supposing that indefinite
power were to be given to the General Legislature, there
was no reason to fear that it would take from the States
any branch of their power whose operation was beneficial,
instancing the existence undisturbed of townships, etc.,
within the States, whose local authority no legislature had
interfered with. The great objection to a General Government was the impracticability of its extending "its care to
all minute objects which fall under the cognizance of local
jurisdictions." If such care were practicable, "the people
would not be less free as the members of one great Republic than as members of thirteen small ones."
"Taking the reverse as the supposition, that a tendency
should be left in the State Governments toward an independence on the General Government, and the gloomy conWere ever words
sequences need not be pointed out."
more prophetic? And mark what follows immediately:
"The imagination of them must have suggested to the
States the experiment we are now making, to prevent the
calamity, and must have formed the chief motive with those
present to undertake the arduous task." The second resolution was passed, Connecticut this time voting with the majority. Mr. Madison's arguments must have satisfied Dr.
Johnson!
The next question was on the third resolution-and the
first discussion was as to the way in which the members
of the first branch of the General Legislature should be
elected. The resolution said "by the people of the several
States." General Pinckney moved to substitute that they
should be elected "in such manner as the Legislature of
each State should direct." This was not avowedly intended
to give the election to the States as such, but it was so interpreted by Mr. Martin and Mr. Hamilton, the former instantly seconding the motion, the latter opposing it because
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it "would essentially vitiate the plan. It would increase
that State influence which could not be too watchfully
guarded against." Election by the people was strenuously
advocated by Mr. Mason, Mr. Wilson and Mr. King. Mr.
Rutledge denied that there was any solid distinction between
a "mediate and immediate election by the people," and
thought a better class of men would be sent to the General
Legislature by the State Legislatures than by the people.
The three gentlemen just mentioned thought the distinction
most vital; they urged that the direct participation by the
people in the new government was "the foundation of
the fabric"-elections by Legislatures would not be
actuated by the sentiments of the people; indeed, there was
an official legislative sentiment opposed to the General
Government, and, moreover, the Legislatures would choose
men subservient to their own views. We seem to have had
examples of the converse of this proposition in these latter
days! General Pinckney's motion was lost, Connecticut
again in the minority this time. The resolution was then
passed as reported, New Jersey alone disse ntihg. Maryland, as usual, divided. One cannot fail to observe the constant but abortive attempts of the "State rights" men to
engraft upon the plan something clearly rfeognizing those
"rights," or more properly, those powers,- which would
stamp the States as distinct and complete sovereignties.
And it is also not to be forgotten, that it was not only the
large States-repeatedly stated to be only three-which
were opposed to these attempts.
The debates continued on various points and questions,
without anything of importance with regard to the inquiry
in which we are now engaged, until June 27, when the resolutions as to suffrage in the two branches of the General
Legislature came before the House. The seventh resolution
provided that representation in the first branch ought to
be in proportion to the number of white and other free inhabitants, etc.
Mr. Luther Martin immediately took the floor, and in a
speech of some length, and "which was delivered with much
diffuseness, and considerable vehemence," proceeded to lay
down the whole anti-national position, contending that the
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new Government should be organized for States, not for
people, and that the proposed plan would leave the small
States wholly at the mercy of the large ones-taking for
granted that it was at least probable, if not certain, that the
representatives from the large States would always be
found voting on the same side. At the conclusion of Mr.
Martin's speech, Mr. Lansing, seconded by Mr. Dayton,
moved in substance that the right of suffrage be the same
as under the Confederation. Mr. Williamson observed that
if the States were equally sovereign now, they would retain that equality when each one had parted with, equal
portions of it. Mr. Madison said that the fallacy in -the
reasoning of the other side was in confounding a mere
treaty between sovereign States with a compact by which
an authority was created paramount to the parties, and
making laws for the government of them. He likened the
States in the proposed plan to counties-and contended that
the true interest of the small States was to make that resemblance as strong as possible: "In a word, the two. extremes before us are, a perfect separation, and a perfect incorporation of the thirteen States. In the first case, they
would be independent nations, subject to no law but the
law of nations. In the last, they would be mere counties
of one entire republic, subject to one common law., In the
first case, the smaller States would have everything to fear
from the larger. In the last, they would have nothing to
fear," etc., etc. Dr. Johnson said, truly enough, that the
controversy was likely to be endless where the starting
point of the contestants was not the same-same regarding
the States as States and others as merly parts of a State.
(I do not quote him verbatim.) His conclusion was that
these two ideas might be and should be combined-by giving the people as such representation in one branch and
the States representation as such in the other-a view
which, as we know, finally prevailed, though with an important qualification, as will be noticed later on. The
great advantage in point of security to the smaller States
by uniting with the large ones under one government was
well pointed out by Mr. Gorham. The plan was not sufficiently "National"-that is, centralized-to suit Mr. Read.
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But Mr. Madison and Mr. Gerry (who, by the way, asserted
that the States never were independent), and others, while
urging consolidation, and picturing the dissolution of the
Union as a dire calamity, were sensible of the unwisdom
of entirely abolishing or ignoring the States. By a vote
of six to four, and one divided-as usual-the clause in
the seventh resolution, that the representation ought not to
be according to that established by the Articles of Confederation, was passed. Every argument that could be
imagined was brought forward-and most of them were
unanswered and unanswerable-to show the advantage of all concerned, and the abstract justice of the
rule of proportionate representation; but apparently without avail. The vote was just as it would probably. have
been if not a word had been uttered on either side. Once
more, however, let it not be forgotten that only four States
were against proportionate representation, three of the
smaller ones joining with the larger ones on this and other
kindred questions. The present vote, however, only decided that the old rule of representation should not obtain
as to the first branch. It was now moved to postpone the
rest of the seventh resolution, to take up the eighth, which
provided for the same rule of representation in the second
branch as in the first. This, of course, occasioned a long
and warm debate; it was the rock upon which the Convention was nearly wrecked. It would not be profitable
to follow it in detail. It was in the main, of course, the
old fight between the nationalists and anti-nationalists. But
here and there some things of interest and importance are
-to be found. Mr. Wilson called attention to the fact that
the vote last taken if the delegates were to be considered as
representing the people of the States, had shown that the
people favored a change in the rule of representation in the
proportion of ninety to twenty-two, and asked whether
the government about to be formed was "for inen, or for
the imaginary beings called States?".He was, of course,
for proportionate representation in both branches, believing that any other rule placed the majority in the
hands of the minority. Mr. Ellsworth denied this, and said
that it simply gave the minority a salutary check upon the
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majority. As a possible instance of combination among the

larger States. he said that if in pursuance of some commercial arrangement, "two or three free ports and no more
were to be established," Boston, Philadelphia, and some
port on the Chesapeake (in Virginia) might be chosen. The
important point was brought out by Mr. Madison that it was
not the size of the States, but their circumstances, which
gave them different interests, and that the real difference
was between the free North and the slave-holding South.
Another difficulty suggested-and one which undoubtedly

existed-was the inconveniently large number of Senators
resulting from proportionate representation. Dr. Franklin
suggested that on certain questions the States should have
an equal vote in the Senate, and Mr. King expressed surprise that "if we were convinced that every man in America
was secured in all his rights, we should be ready to sacrifice
this substantial good to the phantom of State sovereignty,"
etc. Mr. Ellsworth said that while under a National Government, he should participate in national security, he
wanted domestic happiness, dependent on local matters to
which a National Government could not attend, and for
which he looked to the State Government. Mr. King was
for preserving the State governments to the extent necessary for those purposes. The vote resulted in a tie-under
ordinary circumstances it would have resulted in the adoption of the resolution by a majority of one, Georgia and
Maryland being divided. But Mr. Martin's colleague, Mr.
Jennifer, was absent, and he alone cast the vote of the State.
Strictly speaking, the vote was upon a motion of Mr. Ellsworth's, providing for one vote by each State in the Senate. In spite of the fact-for unfortunately it was a factbrought out by Mr. Madison as to the real difference between the North and South, there had been no such grouping of States thus far. Another apparently remarkable
feature of the debates is, that it seems to have been assumed
that the votes of the representatives from any State, even
under proportionate representation, would be unanimous
upon all questions; that they would be like so many delegates to political converitions as we know them to-day.
We must remember, however, that this was before the day
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of political parties.

Still, one would suppose that as this

form of representation was designedly proposed to give the
people, as such, a voice, it might readily have been seen
that the views and interests of people in different parts of
the same State are not always identical.
Expressions of some heat had been indulged in, and a
deadlock was imminent, when General Pinckney suggested
the appointment of a committee to "devise and report some compromise," which drew forth from Mr. Martin the remark that he had no objection, but that the
smaller States would never consent to any diminution
of their equal sovereignty. However, after some little
discussion, a committee was appointed; consisting of
one member from each State--Mr. G6rry, Mr. Ellsworth, Mr. Yates, Mr. Patterson, Dr. Franklin, Mr. Bedford, Mr. Martin, Mr. Mason, Mr. Rutledge, Mr. Baldwin.
This committee reported two propositions, both, or neither,
to be adopted. The first to the effect that each State should
be allowed in the first branch one representative for every
forty thousand inhabitants "of the description reported in
the seventh resolution." States not containing that number
(there is still one State which contains but little more) to
be allowed one vote. "That all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers
of the Government of the United States, shall originate in
the first branch of the Legislature, and shall not be altered
or amended in the second branch; and that no money shall be
drawn from the public treasury but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated in the first branch." The second,
"that in the second branch each State should have an equal
vote." Like most efforts at compromise, the report found
but little favor with any one. It was most unsatisfactory
to Nationalists, who could not see that there had been any
substantial concession on the part of the small Statesthe provision as to originating money bills did not strike
them as being such a concession-and they felt that the
abandonment of proportionate representation in the Senate
was a grievous error. Mr. Gouverneur Morris said flatly
that State attachments and State importance had been the
bane of the country. But others, while not liking the propo-
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sitions, felt that even a compromise was better than nothing
-and so they began to discuss the propositions somewhat
in detail, and committed the clause fixing the representation'in the first branch to a new committee. The clause relating to money bills was then postponed in order to take
up the question of representation in the second branch.
Lucius S. Landreth.

